The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere

[Chris]

Here’s another idea that has been going through my mind.

Historically, the Japanese claimed to liberate the Western colonial empire – and replaced them with a regime that was far worse than the worst of the Western Empires. What if they’d actually kept their promises and treated their new subjects decently? Maybe they decide that this is a requirement to win the war and plan to clamp down after the new empire is secure – maybe they actually mean it.

What effect would this have on the war?

Chris

[MrP]

Forgive me my general ignorance in this area. As I understand it, the Dutch colonies already had such an independence movement as was happy to lock up the Colonists. Japanese military might managed to acquire most of what it set out to for a variety of reasons. So three things strike me. First, this will be most beneficial to Japanese aims in such areas as India, where they have yet to make significant inroads. Second, technological considerations must still be borne in mind. Third, the Japanese Army itself should be remembered. That is to say, one should be wary of suggesting that one can condition an army to rape and massacre in China, then ship it a few hundred miles to another non-Japanese area, and expect it to be well-behaved.

[American God]

Here’s another idea that has been going through my mind.

Historically, the Japanese claimed to liberate the Western colonial empire – and replaced them with a regime that was far worse than the worst of the Western Empires. What if they’d actually kept their promises and treated their new subjects decently? Maybe they decide that this is a requirement to win the war and plan to clamp down after the new empire is secure – maybe they actually mean it.

What effect would this have on the war?

Chris

Not sufficient to overcome US production advantages. A lot of people in the Philippines and other places might still be alive in 1945, though. Japan still eats two nukes and surrenders on schedule.

As to plausibility.... almost impossible. The arrogance and brutality of the Japanese Army in 1941 is quite entrenched. You need a half-generation or more of change after an early POD to even have a shot at changing this.

[Sargon]

It isn't impossible given the example of Japanese rule of Taiwan, but remember that was a model colony. You need a PoD during the Taishō period to forestall the military nastiness and give Taishō democracy a chance to develop, but then I would imagine without the form of military mindset that took over in the 30s, the Japanese may not be so interested in going as far in scope in S.E. Asia as they did OTL.


Sargon

[Straha]

Have Emperor Taisho be healthier and a bit more strong-willed. A longer Taisho era could lead to a Japan that is a semi-liberal democracy like in the 1920s but tips over to becomin fully liberal in the 30s and 40s.

Such a Japan would be in a position to join the allies and liberate colonies of occupied nations, and of course put local nationalist leaders on top.

[Mostlyharmless]

Have Emperor Taisho be healthier and a bit more strong-willed. A longer Taisho era could lead to a Japan that is a semi-liberal democracy like in the 1920s but tips over to becomin fully liberal in the 30s and 40s...
The development of Taisho Democracy did not require the intervention of the Emperor. It may even have helped that idea of a right wing “Taisho Restoration” by analogy with the later talk of a “Showa Restoration” was implausible. However, there was an intrinsic weakness in Taisho Liberalism that it it was driven by an alliance of two different groups. These were people who would later remain liberals such as the young Ishibashi Tanzan and others such as Nagai Ryutaro who supported ideas such as universal male suffrage because they wanted a less feudal and more efficient Japanese Empire (we have to remember that at the start of the Taisho period, Japanese Government was still strongly influenced by the Satchō Alliance that had won the Boshin War). The call for “reform” even attracted some very unlikely liberals such as Prince Konoe after watching the Japanese Foreign Ministry losing in a public relations campaign against Chinese representatives at Versailles. The obvious dividing line between the groups was over the issue of policy towards China with Ishibashi noting the similarity of the Chinese reaction against foreign influence to the late Tokugawa Japanese slogan of “joi” (expel the barbarians) while the others supported a determined defence of Japanese economic interests.

However, there was also a strong conservative group linked to the Court and headed by men such as Prince Saionji Kinmochi committed to good relations with the Anglo-American powers. Thus the liberals had some allies outside the ranks of the reformers over foreign policy issues or at least over issues involving the Anglo-American powers (this group was probably nor worried about public opinion in China). Unfortunately, those men was noticeably older and the group's influence would naturally diminish. It would also diminish unnaturally as those figures were targeted by assassins.

Finally the effect of the triumph of the democracies in 1918 was also important in making democracy seem the idea of the future. Unfortunately, the appearance of the modern dictatorships as the interwar period continued would remove and even reverse that influence.

Thus we would only expect Taisho Democracy to continue as Showa Democracy if its leaders succeeded in maintaining Japanese prosperity and were seen to be running a successful foreign policy (not very plausible over 1927-32). It is possible that frequent Imperial interventions in support of elected politicians against their rivals might have led to a different outcome of either democracy or a change of Emperor.

There is one much more limited change that might have altered the nature of Japanese war making. After WW1, IJA officers studied the campaigns and noticed that, for example, the Allied victory of 1918 was achieved by taking large numbers of Germans prisoner. They concluded that it was critical that Japanese soldiers should be indoctrinated so that they would not surrender. This was a logical conclusion. However, it would have been equally logical to have determined that Japanese policy and training should develop to encourage their enemies to surrender readily.

We can perhaps imagine that such a policy might have allowed Japan to capture much of the German trained Chinese Army that they defeated at Shanghai and pursued to Nanking. That army might have been quite disillusioned with the KMT after its generals had fled leaving them to the Japanese and might possibly have been interested in changing sides.

[RBC]

Honestly, Japan needed to be on a war footing more than any other country at war, with the possible exception of its European cobelligerents. For those reasons alone, it's implausible to have a tame coprosperity sphere as long as the war is being waged. Unless, of course, the U.S. joins the Axis, or is otherwise not viewed as an immediate obstacle to Axis war aims.